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orm and thus is unhidden. Both sentences speak of the primacy of the idea ofthe good as enabling both the correctness of knowing and the unhiddenness of the known. Here truth still is, at one and the same time, unhiddenness and correctness, although unhiddenness already stands under the yoke of the ˘*X".
The same ambiguity in the determination of the essence of truth still prevails in Aristotle as well. In the closing chapter of Book IX of the Metaphysics (Metaphysics, 1, 10, 1051 a34 ff.) where Aristotelian thinking on the being of beings reaches its peak, unhiddenness is the all-controlling fundamental trait of beings. But Aristotle can also say @ (Vk zFJ4g J˛ Rg *@H 6"´ J˛ 80hxgH z<g J@ˆH
:kV(:"F4<...88’ z<g *4"<@\ (Metaphysics, E, 4, 1027 b25 ff.). "In fact, the false and the true are not in things (themselves) . . . but in the understanding."
The intellect’s judgment and assertion is now the place of truth and falsehood and of the difference between them. The assertion is called true insofar as it conforms to the state of affairs and thus is ˇ:@\TFH. This determination of the essence of truth no longer contains an appeal to 8Zhg4" in the sense of unhiddenness; on the contrary 8Zhg4", now taken as the opposite of Rg *@H (i.e., of the false in the sense of the incorrect), is thought of as correctness. From now on this characterization of the essence of truth as the correctness of both representation and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking. As evidence of that, let it suffice to cite the guiding theses that typify how the essence of truth is characterized in the main epochs of metaphysics. [233]
Thomas Aquinas’ thesis holds good for medieval scholasticism: veritas proprie invenitur in intellectu humano vel divino (Quaestiones de veritate, quaestio I, articulus 4, responsio): "Truth is properly encountered in the intellect, whether human or divine." The intellect is where truth has its essential locus. In this text truth is no longer 8Zhg4" but ˇ:@\TF4H (adaequatio).
At the beginning of modern times Descartes sharpens the previous thesis by saying: veritatem proprie vel falsitatem non nisi in solo intellectu esse posse (Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Regula VIII, Opuscula posthuma X, 396). "Truth or falsehood in the proper sense can be nowhere else but in the intellect alone."
And in the age when the modern era enters its fulfillment Nietzsche sharpens the previous thesis still further when he says, "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live. In the final analysis, the value for life is what is decisive." (Note from the year 1885, The Will to Power, number 493.) If for Nietzsche truth is a kind of error, then its essence consists in a way of thinking that always, indeed necessarily, falsifies the real, specifically insofar as every act of representing halts the continual "becoming" and, in erecting its established facts against the flow of "becoming," sets up as the supposedly real something that does not correspond -- i.e., something incorrect and thus erroneous.
Nietzsche's determination of truth as the incorrectness of thinking is in agreement with the traditional essence of truth as the correctness of assertion (8‘(@H). Nietzsche's concept of truth displays the last glimmer of the most extreme consequence of the change of truth from the unhiddenness of beings to the correctness of the gaze . The change itself is brought about in the determination of the being of beings (in Greek: the being present of what is present) as ˘*X".
As a consequence of this interpretation of beings, being present is no longer what it was in the beginning of Western thinking: [234] the emergence of the hidden into unhiddenness, where unhiddenness itself, as revealing, constitutes the fundamental trait of being present. Plato conceives being present (@ F4") as ˘*X". However, ˘*X" is not subordinate to unhiddenness in the sense of serving what is unhidden by bringing it to appearance. Rather, the opposite is the case: it is the shining
(the self-showing) that, within its essence and in a singular self-relatedness, may yet be called unhiddenness. The ˘*X" is not some foreground that 8Zhg4" puts out front to present things;10 rather, the ˘*X" is the ground that makes 8Zhg4" possible. But even as such the ˘*X" still lays claim to something of the original but unacknowledged essence of 8Zhg4".
Truth is no longer, as it was qua unhiddenness, the fundamental trait of being itself. Instead, as a consequence of being yoked under the idea, truth has become correctness, and henceforth it will be a characteristic of the knowing of beings.
Ever since, there has been a striving for "truth" in the sense of the correctness of the gaze and of the correctness of its direction. Ever since, what matters in all our fundamental orientations toward beings is the achieving of a correct view of the ideas. The reflection on B"4*g\" and the change in the essence of 8Zhg4" belong together and belong within the same tale of the passage from one abode to another, the tale that is recounted in the "allegory of the cave."
The difference between the two abodes, the one inside and the one outside the cave, is a difference of F@n\". In general this word means being astute about something, being skilled at something. Properly speaking F@n\" means being astute about that which is present as the unhidden and which, as present, perdures.11 Astuteness is not the equivalent of merely possessing knowledge. It means inhering within an abode that everywhere and primarily has a hold in what perdures. [235]
The kind of astuteness that is normative down there in the cave -- ” ƒ6gˆ F@n\" (516 c5) -- is surpassed by another F@n\". This latter strives solely and above all else to glimpse the being of beings in the "ideas." This F@n\", in contrast to the one in the cave, is distinguished by the desire to reach out beyond what is immediately present and to acquire a basis in that which, in showing itself, perdures. In itself this F@n\" is a predilection for and friendship with (n48\") the "ideas," which bestow the unhidden. Outside the cave F@n\" is n48@F@n\". The Greek language already knew this word before the time of Plato and used it in general to name the predilection for correct astuteness. Plato first appropriated the word as a name for the specific astuteness about beings that at the same time defines the being of beings as idea. Since Plato, thinking about the being of beings has become -- "philosophy," because it is a matter of gazing up at the "ideas." But the "philosophy" that begins with Plato has, from that point on, the distinguishing mark of what is later called "metaphysics." Plato himself concretely illustrates the basic outline of metaphysics in the story recounted in the "allegory of the cave." In fact the coining of the word "metaphysics" is already prefigured in Plato's presentation. In the passage (516) that depicts the adaptation of the gaze to the ideas, Plato says (516 c3): Thinking goes :gJz ƒ6gˆ<", "beyond" those things that are experienced merely in the form of mere shadows and images, and goes g´H J" J", "out toward" these things, namely, the "ideas." These are the suprasensuous, seen with a nonsensuous gaze; they are the being of beings, which cannot be grasped with our bodily organs. And the highest in the region of the suprasensuous is that idea which, as the idea of all ideas, remains the cause of the subsistence and the appearing of all beings. Because this "idea" is thereby the cause of everything, it is therefore also "the idea" that is called "the good." This highest and first cause is named by Plato and correspondingly by Aristotle J˛ hgˆ@<, the divine. Ever since being got interpreted as ˘*X", thinking about the being of beings [236] has been metaphysical, and metaphysics has been theological. In this case theology means the interpretation of the "cause" of beings as God and the transferring of being onto this cause, which contains being in itself and dispenses being from out of itself, because it is the being-est of beings.
This same interpretation of being as ˘*X", which owes its primacy to a change in the essence of
8Zhg4", requires that viewing the ideas be accorded high distinction. Corresponding to this distinction is B"4*g\", the "education" of human beings. Concern with human being and with the position of humans amidst beings entirely dominates metaphysics.
The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the same time the beginning of "humanism." Here the word must be thought in its essence and therefore in its broadest sense. In that regard "humanism" means the process that is implicated in the beginning, in the unfolding, and in the end of metaphysics, whereby human beings, in differing respects but always deliberately, move into a central place among beings, of course without thereby being the highest being. Here "human being" sometimes means humanity or humankind, sometimes the individual or the community, and sometimes the people [das Volk] or a group of peoples. What is always at stake is this: to take "human beings," who within the sphere of a fundamental, metaphysically established system of beings are defined as animal rationale, and to lead them, within that sphere, to the liberation of their possibilities, to the certitude of their destiny, and to the securing of their "life." This takes place as the shaping of their "moral" behavior, as the salvation of their immortal souls, as the unfolding of their creative powers, as the development of their reason, as the nourishing of their personalities, as the awaking of their civic sense, as the cultivation of their bodies, or as an appropriate combination of some or all of these "humanisms." What takes place in each instance is a metaphysically determined revolving around the human being, whether in narrower or wider orbits. With the fulfillment of metaphysics, "humanism" (or [237] in "Greek" terms: anthropology) also presses on to the most extreme -- and likewise unconditioned -- "positions."
Plato's thinking follows the change in the essence of truth, a change that becomes the history of metaphysics, which in Nietzsche's thinking has entered upon its unconditioned fulfillment. Thus Plato's doctrine of "truth" is not something that is past. It is historically "present," not just in the sense that his teachings have a "later effect" that historians can calculate, nor as a reawakening or imitation of antiquity, not even as the mere preservation of what has been handed down. Rather, this change in the essence of truth is present as the all-dominating fundamental reality -- long established and thus still in place -- of the ever-advancing world history of the planet in this most modern of modern times.
Whatever happens with historical human beings comes in each case from a decision about the essence of truth that happened long ago and is never up to humans alone. Through this decision the lines are always already drawn regarding what, in the light of the established essence of truth, is sought after and established as true and likewise what is thrown away and passed over as untrue.
The story recounted in the "allegory of the cave" provides a glimpse of what is really happening in the history of Western humanity, both now and in the future: Taking the essence of truth as the correctness of the representation, one thinks of all beings according to "ideas" and evaluates all reality according to "values." That which alone and first of all is decisive is not which ideas and which values are posited, but rather the fact that the real is interpreted at all according to "ideas," that the "world" is weighed at all according to "values."
Meanwhile we have recollected the original essence of truth. Unhiddenness12 reveals itself to this recollection as the fundamental trait of beings themselves.13 Nonetheless, recollection of [238] the original essence of truth must think this essence more originally. Therefore, such recollection can never take over unhiddenness merely in Plato's sense, namely as yoked under the ˘*X". As Plato conceives it, unhiddenness remains harnessed to a relation to looking, apprehending, thinking and asserting. To follow this relation means to relinquish the essence of unhiddenness. No attempt to ground the essence of unhiddenness in "reason," "spirit," "thinking," "logos," or in any kind of "subjectivity," can ever rescue the essence of unhiddenness. In all such attempts, what is to be grounded -- the essence of hiddenness itself -- is still not adequately sought out. What always gets "clarified" is merely some essential consequence of the uncomprehended essence of unhiddenness.
What is first required is an appreciation of the "positive" in the "privative" essence of 8Zhg4". The positive must first be experienced as the fundamental trait of being itself. First of all what must break in upon us is that exigency whereby we are compelled to question not just beings in their being but first of all being itself (that is, the difference). Because this exigency stands before us, the original esse
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